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Abstract This paper looks at the origins of the British tea industry of India from the
standpoint of colonial and semicolonial involvement in, respectively, British India
and Qing China. The imposition of the tea industry in Assam was integrally tied to
the wars in East Asia fought in order to open markets for the movement of opium
and other commodities. British officials championed both policies in the name of
modern economic progress, liberalizing trade with the Qing and establishing a
productive industry in Assam. The agricultural science of political economy aimed to
extract the value of various objects which could then be united in a land hitherto
considered a wasteland. Plants, soil and labor were each viewed as isolatable things
whose values were objective and calculable. Such static representation, however,
was already belied by the dynamic process of gathering and transporting these
“things” across the vast and unevenly developed regions of Asia, ultimately valoriz-
ing them as a breakfast drink commodity enjoyed worldwide. The origins of the
Assam tea plantations, mirroring developments elsewhere, relied upon spatio-
economic connections that force us to reevaluate how the specific histories of British
India, Qing China and Southeast Asia are inseparably linked.
*****
Karl Marx, Capital, Volume one (1867).1
20 yards of linen =
1 coat =
10 lbs of tea =
40 lbs of coffee =
1 quarter of corn = = 2 ounces of gold
2 ounces of gold =
1/2 a ton of iron =
x Commodity A =
Journal of Historical Sociology Vol. 23 No. 1 March 2010
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-6443.2009.01360.x
© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA
02148, USA.
The first modern, capital-intensive tea plantation in India was
but one result of the wide-ranging economic circuits encompassing
regions scattered throughout Asia and Europe, which, among
other developments, spurred profound transformations in north-
east India and the southern coasts of Qing China. It was during the
early nineteenth-century decades of nascent British rule in the
region of Assam when the following were first established: moneti-
zation, land privatization, wage labor, and great investment in
transportation to the capital city Calcutta. In brief, a remarkably
dense sequence of events over several decades changed areas of
Assam from a region devastated by civil wars into a world-class
agricultural industry which continues in full capacity today. Mean-
time, Indian tea owed much of its origins to the synchronous travel
of north Indian opium into Qing China, via Canton. For Rebecca
Karl, opium holds a “metonymic role [in] . . . the history of global
commodities in China . . . that brought modernity and its related
crises to China.” Such history could be read as “a crisis of
opium . . . as the marker of global capitalism in its imperialist
colonizing form.”2 Undeniably, the momentous changes unfolding
simultaneously in both regions, and the corresponding movements
of particular commodities, were not unrelated to one another. The
point here is simply that Indian opium in China and Chinese tea in
India need to be thought together, not only because they crossed
paths but also because they were central to the historical develop-
ment of new economic forms taking shape in their respective
locales.3
In this essay, I want to suggest that one cannot think about
British Indian history at this moment without also thinking about
British colonial involvement in Qing China.4 Besides perhaps the
opium trade, the establishment of the Indian tea plantation is the
starkest proof of this thesis. My specific focus will be the process of
import substitution wherein the British Assam Company, and its
government predecessor the Tea Committee, appropriated the tea
plant Camellia Sinensis from southern China and cultivated it in
Assam during the 1830s and forties, a complex process which
involved gathering tea seeds, plants and laborers from southern
China, Southeast Asia and northern India in order to catalyze
Indian tea production. Like other plantations around the world,
Indian tea gardens relied upon cheap migrant labor settled on the
land as well as a large cooperative infrastructure modeled upon
the factory systems of urban production. Such gardens were also
notable, however, insofar as British growers depended upon
Chinese teamakers to learn the secret of growing and preparing the
teaplant. The conditions which made the tea plantations a viable
project – the overseas market for tea sold by the British, the system
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of inland transport by Chinese farmers, the institutions of
exchange at Canton – could be seen as a consequence of overseas
trade as much as the byproduct of foreign occupation and land
appropriation. This aspect of the Assam plantations’ history pro-
vides a strong counter-example to prior scholarship which often
forgets the deep interdependence between projects of British colo-
nialism throughout Asia, as though they were only marginally
related to one another.
Simply put, Assam’s development, and the attendant histories of
tea and opium, were made possible by the spatial integration of
capitalism in Asia. For David Harvey, spatial integration is defined
as “the linking of commodity production in different locations
through exchange,” which has generated a remarkable “historical
geography of capitalism,” wherein “[p]eoples of the utmost diversity
of historical experience . . . have been welded . . . into a complex
unity under the international division of labor.”5 The contemporar-
ies of nineteenth century colonialism were well aware of these
circuits, which presented geography less in terms of physical or
statist divisions but rather through economic activity. The logic
manifest itself clearly in the map of Robert Fortune, a British
traveler sent throughout the Chinese countryside to gather tea
seeds and mail them to Calcutta (see figure one). Simultaneously
bearing in mind Fortune’s map while trying to understand the
development of tea plantations in Assam is, I believe, the most
Figure 1: An 1853 map produced by the British explorer Robert Fortune
containing some key locations in the commodity flows of colonial Asia.
The territory of Assam is located in the west, with the tea plantations
labeled near the western edge. The highlighted area labeled “Best Tea”
is the Fujian province’s Wuyi Mountain tea country. Canton is the
main trading port through which opium was purchased by British
country traders.7
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helpful approach for comprehending how the economic and social
transformation of a local space was made possible by the
transfer of technology and knowledge through global circuits of
exchange.6
However, these locales were not integrated in only purely mate-
rialist terms. Assam and Canton were also caught inside bureau-
cratic debates over political economy and the role of the British
state in regulating commerce. In other words, ideas traveled, too.
The most important were the physiocratic notion that economic
value was locatable in land, expressed in the 1793 Permanent
Settlement of Bengal, as well as the subsequent nineteenth-
century ultra-rationalizations of agriculture and trade that inau-
gurated a discourse of economic science animating colonial
enterprise within and beyond the South Asian context. The pur-
veyors of science represented their own activity largely in terms
of organizing, manipulating and improving static things they
encountered overseas, such as plants, animals, people. The tre-
mendously dynamic and overlapping activity that made colonial-
ism possible was often at odds with the bureaucratic rhetoric of
discovery and observation.
I will more closely examine the inaugural years of tea experimen-
tation in following sections, but first I will explicate some details
to clarify their context and background. I wish both to show the
historical conditions within which Indian tea became possible and
also to demonstrate how synchronous events in South and East
Asia were directly linked.
I.
Canton and Free Trade
When the British were awarded the Bengal diwani, or the right to
collect revenue, from the Mughal Empire in 1765, Assam was ruled
by the five-hundred-year old Ahom kingdom, which had reconsoli-
dated its position by fighting off Mughal forces only earlier in the
century. Thus, “Assam lay outside Mughal and thus early British
India.”8 As governor-general Lord Charles Cornwallis wrote in
1792, “we know little more of the interior parts of Nepal and Assam
than those of the interior parts of China.”9
The wars of Burmese invasion (1817–24) brought the Company
closer.10 The British arrived with the stated goal of only securing
their own holdings by fending off the Burmese, who conceded
defeat in 1826. But during the battles, an officer named Robert
Bruce supplied arms and troops to help the Ahom king Chandra
Kanta.11 Bruce, who decided to permanently reside in Assam, later
reported to his younger brother Charles (C.A.) that he had spotted
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an indigenous tea plant growing nearby.12 In one account, the
older Bruce formed an acquaintance with a local Singpho leader
who agreed to furnish him with wild tea plants. Years later, after
the British had successfully defeated the Burmese and won the
Singphos’ favor, C.A. Bruce procured leaves from the same
leader.13
Historian Amalendu Guha showed that despite the “series of civil
wars [that] had ravaged [Assam] since 1769,” which had cut the
local population by two-thirds, the indigenous peoples continued to
maintain their vital commercial activities prior to the Burmese
invasion.14 The people regularly exported items such as raw cotton,
lac dye, silk, and metals to Bengal. Such exchange was conducted
through rent in kind and barter, and the British replaced the
Assamese khel system of revenue, based upon kinship relations,
with a policy of cash payment, extending the system they had
established in the Bengal Presidency. Initial attempts at economic
reform, however, failed to incorporate Assam into the British capi-
talist economy. Currency was simply transmitted back to Calcutta,
and rent in kind continued, if the peoples did not flee their lands
altogether.15
Successive governor-generals recommended that the Assamese
peoples, unproductive with the land, be displaced from their homes
and their lands given to British capitalists willing to invest in and
manage export-oriented cash crops.16 Early suggestions included
sugarcane and indigo, along with tea. By 1834, India governor-
general William Bentinck issued a parliamentary minute to form a
Tea Committee commissioned to investigate prospects for tea pro-
duction in India. Five years later, a group of London merchants
formally created the private Assam Company, two-thirds of the
government’s garden were given to the company free of rent for ten
years, and the employee infrastructure remained continuous from
state to private hands.
The tea capitalists benefited from simultaneous developments
in the opium and tea trade of Canton, which gave urgency to any
project increasing British control over tea production. From the
1784 Commutation Act17 to the dissolution of the East India
Company in 1833, the tea imports of the Company – which held a
monopoly on tea sold to the British and on opium sold to the Qing
– doubled from 16 to 33 million pounds. Well over sixty percent of
the tea came from the Fujian region of south China, where family
farms coordinated a steady supply of tea moving from the Wuyi
Mountain area to Canton.18
The agreement reached between the Company and the Canton
merchants, known as the thirteen cohong (gonghang) merchants,
was formed haphazardly. Samuel Ball, the Company’s resident tea
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inspector for two decades (1804–1826) who had acquired a decent
understanding of the Chinese language, claimed that the cohong
system owed its eighteenth-century origins to British “ignorance of
the language” and the subsequent inability to prevent “the efforts
of the Chinese to establish some form of monopoly.”19 In other
words, the formal trading rights with the Canton cohong merchants
recognized by British private traders were in fact nothing more than
the informal domination of a dozen Chinese trading houses. But
both the British and Canton sides accrued obscene profits from
their respective businesses.
The implications of the tea and opium trade were staggering. By
the 1830s tea represented one-tenth of all revenue generated in
England and the entirety of the Company’s trade profit.20 As for
opium, historian John Richards showed that opium profits until
1840 represented five to ten percent of the Company’s total revenue
including land taxes.21 Even during the Company’s heyday, its
Auditor-General T.C. Melville stated bluntly in 1830, “I am pre-
pared to say that India does entirely depend upon the profits of the
China trade.”22 In the 1830s, however, the British state ended the
Company monopoly, and the cohong responded with increased
prices and tactics which angered British traders, who clamored for
war against the Canton protectionists (as Karl Marx remarked, “in
this strange Indian history . . . the Indian monopolisers were the
first preachers of free trade in England”23).
Sudipta Sen has shown that such free trade rhetoric could be
traced to the 1793 Settlement’s stated intention to free exchange
from the hold of local despots.24 For Sen, the British occupation
of Bengal operated within the twin logics of free trade and state
enforcement. Sure enough, violent measures in Assam and
Canton became justifiable in the name of utilitarianism – mea-
sures such as the displacement of the Assamese from their land
and the opium wars waged against the Qing. In the years pre-
ceding the war, Tea Committee officials promoted Assamese tea
by bemoaning the inconvenience of buying tea from China in the
same idiom brandished by warhawks. In 1834 Bentinck invoked
the necessity of “our Empire” to “annihilate the Chinese
monopoly” with tea grown in its own colonies.25 The rest is a
familiar story. The 1842 Treaty of Nanjing solved the cohong
monopoly problem by creating five treaty ports and ceding Hong
Kong to Britain, a landmark in the history of unequal treaty law.
As its flipside, Assamese tea obviated dependence upon the
Chinese through the import substitution of tea production. In
this specific sense, the cultivation of Assam tea was the continu-
ation of the opium wars by other means. Now let us turn to the
actual history of tea production in upper Assam.
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II.
Assam, 1836–1850
The Land: Utility and Science
The intellectual legacy of liberal utilitarianism central to both
land dispossession in Assam and war in China was also
acutely expressed in the thought of British officials responsible
for transferring tea production to South Asia. Such men
framed the land, the plants and the laborers in a language of
science and precision, which derived from the utilitarian idea that
abstract principles of efficiency could best guide political and
economic affairs. These principles developed as both the out-
growth and repudiation of the physiocratic ideals behind the
Settlement. In 1813 James Mill, drawing upon Malthus and
Ricardo, attacked the zamindar landlord system for imitating
European aristocracy. Instead of leaving rent to the arbitrary dis-
cretion of the zamindar, he argued, the state should take a direct
approach, assessing land value and administering a precise rent
system.
Mill’s views were influenced by the complex law of rent, which
Malthus had purportedly discovered in 1815 and which had been
subsequently revised by Ricardo.26 Briefly, the law stated that
land value, or rent, could be calculated scientifically. With the
assumption that land, with added labor, was the primary source
of economic value, Mills argued that soil quality should be fully
measured and quantified in order to determine an average, or
normal, rate of profit. The “normal rate of profit” would represent
the quality of the worst soil and would be subtracted from every
farmer’s yields to determine how much surplus the state could
claim. The surplus represented the land’s value, which would be
paid as “true rent.” In other words, farmers on high quality land
would pay high rent, and farmers on poor land would pay
nothing.
Given the law’s scientific precision, however, Mill feared it would
be abused without stringent regulation: “there would be no security
that a rapacious middleman [i.e. the zamindar] would not exact
more than the true rent and do untold harm to the country.”27
Consequently, Mill recommended an assessment of all lands, the
beginnings of the infamous colonial surveys:
To determine the rent of land in India . . . could only be done by a minute inquiry
into the yield of different soils, the costs of production, and the history of agricul-
tural prices. . . . [This meant] an entire reorganization and expansion of the judicial
system, a complete overhaul and reshaping of the administrative service, the survey
and registration of all landholdings, and a scientific assessment of the land revenue
based on detailed statistics of agricultural production.28
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Although utilitarianism’s basic principles originated in England,
they were first tested in India, where state powers were more
extensive. India became a colonial laboratory where “the move-
ments of English life tested their strength and fought their early
battles.”29 In short time, surveys were ordered throughout the
empire.30
It is within this moment of extensively surveying land and nature
where we can best locate the language of scientific improvement
permeating the commercial cultivation of tea in Assam. The utili-
tarian school supported a scientific view of nature insofar as value
was framed as an autonomous thing emanating from the soil,
demanding objective analysis. The Tea Committee’s task was to
investigate, uncover and cultivate the inborn qualities of the Assa-
mese soil and harmonize it with Chinese tealeaves. The spirit was
best captured by Bentinck, who argued that the task at hand was
the “naturalization of . . . foreign plants and vegetables, the natives
of climates very different from our own.” Although other plants had
already failed to grow in India, such failure was attributed to the
soil’s inadequacy. The key to new ventures was isolating “a peculiar
soil, united to a particular climate” and harmonizing it with the
plant. Through a scientific understanding of Chinese plants, the
British believed they could successfully grow them elsewhere. But
officials also wished to perfect the plants. As one famously noted:
“[W]hen the skill and science of the Europeans, aided by thermom-
eters, &c, shall once be applied to the cultivation and preparation
of tea in favourable situations, the Chinese tea will soon be excelled
in quality and flavor.”31
In January of 1836, a scientific panel composed of three men,
described as “two former botanists” and a “geologist,”32 accompa-
nied C.A. Bruce, who was familiar with the terrain, into northeast
Assam to examine native plants and assess the prospects for
establishing nurseries. They decided that importing Chinese plants
would be superior to cultivating the “wild . . . jungly stock” of
Assam.33 Once the Chinese plant was introduced, “it may be
expected that the indigenous plant of Assam will lose . . . [its] bad
qualities.” To guarantee this mutation, “the pollen of the Chinese
plant must be applied to the stigma of those of Assam” repeatedly.34
In May, Bruce was promoted to Superintendent of Tea Forests and
given the task of growing the plants on a tight budget. On October
third, G.J. Gordon, an opium trader sent to buy tea plants and hire
teamakers from Canton, wrote that his “Chinamen” had arrived. He
brought three laborers, two of whom could make black tea.35 By the
end of the year, Bruce and the teamakers had successfully grown
and sent a batch of plants to Calcutta. A good practitioner of science,
he took detailed notes documenting the experiments.
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The Seeds and Teamakers: A Second History of
Circuits of Exchange
As Bruce’s concern was long-term profit, he framed his experi-
ments in terms of large-scale and future reproduction. For
example, tea plants did not naturally improve with age, so they
“would be almost useless for Tea manufacture, as it is the young
leaves, from young trees, that produce the best Teas.”36 Therefore
every three years, large tracts of land would be cleared and burnt
down. Once burnt, the plants would rebound with “vigor,” and the
fortunes would multiply, “for, from every old stock or stump cut
down, ten to twelve more vigorous shoots spring up.”37 Thus,
although the plants owed their genesis to Chinese merchants,
Bruce envisioned a plantation in his own image. With each genera-
tion, the tea plants would become less Chinese, more Indian, and
ultimately optimally conditioned by British botany.
Before he could arrive at that point, however, he needed more
seeds and men. The seeds came easily enough. In 1837, Bruce
received the first large shipment of 1,609 plants, some “healthy”
and some “sickly.”38 The Chinese plants were an average three feet
in height, but the indigenous Assamese plants were “four or five
times the size of theirs.”39 He waited for the plants to produce seeds,
compared the Assamese and Chinese samples, and planted them
under various conditions. Over the next year, he received ship-
ments of eight, seventeen and fifty-two thousand plants. It was no
surprise that by 1855, records noted that the companies in Assam
had “tea seed, mostly China, in excess of what they could use for
their own plantings.”40
Bruce isolated three factors for cultivation: rain, soil and shade.
For example, he noted that plants transported in the sun and rain
would generally survive; from shade to sun in the rain, more would
die; and from shade to sun in “uncongenial soil” with much rain,
“not one in fifty will be alive the third year.” He recommended
cutting down the wild plants and harvesting new specimens at
low heights, “dwarfish like the Chinese plants.” He believed the
“Singpho territories are overrun with wood jungle, and if only the
under wood was cleared, they would make a noble Tea country.”41
And he respected the delicate economy of each creation, recom-
mending watering the roots but “above inundation” and letting the
plants mature in robust soil “provided it were planted in deep
shade.”42
Interestingly, Bruce’s tract represented probably the earliest
British knowledge of Chinese teamaking ever, for, despite a
century-long trade with Canton, merchants had no prior knowledge
of how or where tea was cultivated. The inspector Ball had con-
The Birth of a Noble Tea Country 81
© 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Journal of Historical Sociology Vol. 23 No. 1 March 2010
fessed in a footnote, “I have never seen tea made for sale.”43 The
only clue regarding the origins of the seeds and men is a brief line
in Bruce’s recorded conversations; he noted that the teamakers had
come from “Kong-see,” on the mountains, about 40 days journey by
water to Canton, and two days journey from the great Tea country
“Mow-ee-san.”44 Referencing Fortune’s map, one recognizes that
“Kong-see” was a reference to Jiangxi and that “Mow-ee-san” was
really the Wuyi mountain (Wuyishan) range. Bruce himself had no
idea about the histories of the land and peoples of these areas, but,
pushing our analysis further, such histories help disclose the deep
connections between global trade and patterns of agricultural and
commercial development in southern China. That is, they provide
an entry point into investigating the origins of the tea seeds and tea
makers who traveled in Assam, origins which were rendered
opaque by their commoditization in the markets of Canton.
For starters, we can trace the men and plants back to southern
China by looking at their teamaking techniques. The two men
were black teamakers, but English “black tea” actually refers to
Chinese oolong, or semifermented, and red, or fully-fermented, teas
(qingcha and hongcha).45 Biochemist and historian H.T. Huang
concluded that red tea was not widely produced until the 1850s,
which means the British had been drinking oolong tea the previous
two centuries.46 Huang’s conclusion is confirmed by Bruce, who
detailed that the two men fermented freshly-picked leaves by drying
them in the sun but only “permitted [them] to dry about two hours,
being occasionally turned.”47 The time limit means the men made
semi-fermented tea, verified by recorded descriptions for the
method of making the dark tea of Fujian’s Wuyi mountains. An
anonymous author in the 1735 compilation Continuing the Classic
of Tea wrote that picked Wuyi tea leaves are “placed on bamboo
baskets and exposed to the wind and sun.” After the “green color is
a little faded they are stir-fried and oven dried.”48 In other words,
the semifermented process.49
How the Wuyi mountains of Fujian became a region of specialized
production is best explained by broad changes from the Ming and
Qing dynasties. During the Ming, tax policies were collapsed into
silver payments, which drew massive amounts of bullion from
Japan and Peru into a burgeoning economy and population, spur-
ring trade in ceramics, silk and tea for silver.50 Much like opium
during the Qing, this extensive coastal trade had deep implications
for inland economic change. For instance, Robert Marks has argued
that with population growth, farmers “increasingly turned much of
their farmland over to producing commodities that were sold in the
market.”51 Marks’ research supports Hill Gates’ claim that southern
Chinese societies accurately fit the category of petty capitalist
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production, in which a household produces items for home usage
but also depends “on engagement with the market, including the
buying and selling of labor power” for continued reproduction.52
But the family-based arrangements were qualitatively different
from London factories or New World plantations insofar as they
tempered market demands by withdrawing their labor from the
market.”53 Another example of mixed economies at local levels was
the persistence of rent in kind. While state taxes were uniformly
paid in silver, many landlords asked for crops instead. In Fujian,
“where small-scale cultivation of tea was common, tenants had to
sell their tea to landlords.”54
By 1840, of the thirty million pounds of export tea purchased by
British ships, ninety percent came from the Wuyi tea country.55 Its
growth followed the pattern of long distance trade and global
markets spurring greater production from decentralized household
economies. It was a “golden era of tea production.” Expansion
encouraged migration to peripheral areas, and hills unsuitable for
grains were converted into tea farms.56 During the 1820s, a com-
mentator noted, “[t]he mountains are wasteland without grain
crops. . . . [T]he mountain land is rented out to Jiangxi people who
open up cultivation to plant tea.”57
Further evidence of commercialization can be found in local
sources. Gazetteers catalogued stories about tea as early as the
sixteenth century. In a 1737 story entitled “Record of a travel
through the Wuyi Mountains,” the author travels through the Wuyi
passes during a storm, finding refuge in a cave where he meets
indigenous peoples who offer him tea leaves.58 Later, the romantic
travel journal entries were accompanied by the framing of tea as a
commercial crop. In the 1769 gazetteer, one entry noted:
At the start of the Qing, Wuyi was considered a place of refuge and escape. . . . [Its]
wastelands have recently been reclaimed and used to grow tea. . . . For a temporary
period of time, it becomes crowded with tea pickers, numbering over ten thousand.59
Records from the neighboring Jiangxi also corroborate the nar-
rative: during “the spring there is a sudden influx of hundreds of
thousands of migrants from Jiangxi.” People moved because
Jiangxi “land is poor, and those who till have to eke out a living by
picking tea in Fujian.”60 The oolong teamakers who somehow found
their way to Assam were likely one of these men. That they were
willing to migrate across the world for decent wages is partially
explained by their transient status as temporary laborers back
home.
Following the tales of local records, we wind up with a fairly
complex relationship: Bruce had brought the men to Assam to
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teach him the Chinese way of making tea, but in the larger scheme,
the production of darker teas had already been influenced by
British taste.61 It was British preference that caused so many
laborers to learn the methods for semifermented tea; it was in order
to meet British demand that so many Jiangxi men and women
turned to picking tea; and it was the British trade at Canton that
brought them into a fateful encounter with Gordon which ended
with them on a ship to Assam (six months after which, two would
be dead).62 Thus, just as the British tea plantations in Assam would
not have been possible without the work of the Chinese, we can also
qualify our history by arguing that Chinese manufacture of semi-
fermented and red tea would not have been possible without the
British.
The Labor: Batches of Chinamen and Aborigines
Bruce and the Company took a similar approach to laborers as they
did with seeds: they emphasized utility, so they imported as many
men as possible, but they also emphasized efficiency, so they
prioritized effective but cheap workers, which eventually led them
to the neighboring regions of Assam. Just as tea seeds were traf-
ficked wholesale, so too were local populations.
The Company’s labor policy initially stated that “Chinamen may
be procured in any number if proper means are used to obtain
them.”63 The Company wrote to merchant houses in Singapore,
Batavia and Penang “to secure as many capable hands as can be
picked up from the Chinese Junks.”64 In the hunt for teamakers,
the Company would exhaust all resources available to members of
the British colonial world. First, the Company looked for Chinese
intermediaries in Calcutta. Three years earlier, the Tea Committee
had sought to hire a Chinese migrant doctor named Lumqua to
help translate, but the government refused to pay for his services.
In 1840, the private Assam Company hired him. Lumqua then
introduced the company to another Calcutta Chinese man named
Ekan, and together they recruited potential Chinese apprentices
from domestic and overseas markets. In 1837, a reported 362
Chinese lived in Calcutta.65 A famous legend among the contempo-
rary Chinese community in Calcutta recalls that the first Chinese
person in colonial India was a man named Acchi66 who arrived in
the 1770s on a British ship. Acchi sought permission from the
governor-general to employ “Chinese who have deserted from
Macao ships and remain in Calcutta without any apparent means
of subsistence.”67 But Acchi was dead by 1783; nevertheless, a
steady influx of Chinese migrants, both owners and laborers,
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continued arriving, working as cabinet builders, water tank clean-
ers and sugar farmers.68
Acchi, Lumqua and Ekan shared a formal similarity as English-
speaking Chinese who acted as middlemen for the waves of Chinese
labor passing through India. We can try to understand their role by
examining the interchange between South, Southeast and East
Asia. Among the Chinese in Southeast Asia, a representative acted
as “an intermediary from the Chinese community.” He would
handle communications and take responsibility for things like reg-
istration, marriage, birth, and death paperwork.69 The similarities
between Southeast Asia and Calcutta here provide rudimentary
grounds for suspecting their integration within a larger colonial
trading universe. For over a century prior to the Assam Company,
traders, miners, and shipbuilders left Qing China in vast numbers
to places like Vietnam, Cambodia and Siam.70 These men relied
upon networks established in Qing China, but of course they
overlapped with the movement of Dutch, Portuguese and English
ships. Until the late 1700s, Calcutta, and hence the English,
remained peripheral to the Southeast Asia trade, and the British
firms which served as entrepôts for the Assam Company’s Chinese
labor in 1840 had only recently begun working with the established
Chinese networks. The cornerstone would have to be Singapore,
where Ekan traveled to recruit apprentices. Established in 1819,
Singapore quickly became a trading hub for movements spanning
from Dutch Batavia to Bangkok. According to Trocki, Chinese
traders landed in Singapore to buy more supplies and various crops
to grow in the surrounding areas. Crops demanded workers, and
hence Singapore “became the headquarters of Southeast Asia’s
Chinese labor exchange.” Migrants would secure jobs in the city
first and then were shipped to surrounding plantations.71
The most common organizational form was the lineage and
locality-based kongsi (gongsi). The kongsis were independent of and
sometimes more influential than the local governments. Atop the
hierarchy, the taukeh72 often manipulated workers by setting low
wages and high prices and keeping them in debt. With the intro-
duction of opium and its addictive drain on wages, savings never
quite materialized as the workers hoped.73 The established hierar-
chy helps explain how Ekan could quickly secure so many appren-
tices for the Assam Company.
Prior to Ekan’s trip, workers had been arriving at Assam in
waves. In November 1839, a “batch” (Bruce’s term) of fifty came
from Penang; in January 1840, 64 followed. Finally, in February,
Ekan’s batch of 247 Chinese from Singapore arrived in Calcutta.74
Most of Ekan’s men were laborers simply looking for jobs, not from
the Fujian tea countries (in the words of one observer, “every man
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with a tail was supposed to be qualified to cultivate, manipulate
and prepare tea”75). Troubles accompanied them. Upon landing,
five were wounded in a disagreement stemming from Ekan extort-
ing three dollars from each man’s advances. In March, they fought
with the townspeople of Pabna, killing four locals. The men refused
to leave until their friends were released from prison, and after
three months, the Company dissolved their contracts and aban-
doned them. The disaster of wholesale importing Chinese labor left
a bad taste with the Company, and subsequent missions focused
solely on finding select Chinese teamakers to team with apprentices
from domestic areas.76
With the refinement of the Company’s recruitment strategies, we
begin to discern a homology between its attitudes towards seeds
and towards the laborers. With seeds, the first step was to exhaust
resources available to British merchants, collecting as many seeds
as possible via men like Gordon and Fortune. Inevitably, some
seeds would be dried or ruined in transport, but the rest were
useful for experimentation. A lack of immediate communication
along with impromptu planning resulted in a seed surplus, and
many were not used. With labor, as many batches as possible were
secured from overseas, but many men turned out to be bad seeds,
useless to Bruce. He complained that too many were arriving
without being filtered for quality. Hence a good portion of the labor
was dismissed, and the Assam Company resolved to only hire
cheap, available workers.
And just as the officials debated the relative values of Assamese
and Chinese tea plants, they also debated the relative qualities of
Indian and Chinese labor. Unlike with plants, however, the down-
trodden status of the Indian became a virtue. For example, Ball wrote
that where the Chinese worker “has a good substantial mud or brick
house, generally thatched,” the Hindoo is “satisfied with a small mud
hut or shed, which he hardly inhabits by day.”77 He concluded the
Hindoo was a subject “of privation” without the comforts of the
Chinese laborer. “So far as the wants of the two people, and wages of
labour are concerned,” he wrote, “India possesses no small advan-
tage over China for the successful cultivation of tea.”78 In other
words, native labor was better acclimated to native soil.
But just like the indigenous Assamese plant, the indigenous
worker needed improvement. It needed to learn Chinese qualities,
such as tea-drying skills, but it also needed to be cleansed of
defects. Specifically, Bruce complained chiefly about laziness and
the Assamese addiction to opium. Unless the British government
could ban opium in Assam, then “the thousands that are about to
emigrate from the plains into Assam, will soon be infected with the
Opium mania.”79
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The hypocrisy should be obvious: the lucrative tea business
Bruce was trying to steal from Canton was largely fueled by the
Company’s ability to popularize opium harvested in Bengal,
Benares and Patna. Assamese addiction was directly related to
British encouragement of opium farms. Further, the impasse of
Assamese addiction highlighted the tension of trying to produce
consumers of British goods while also exploiting them for their
work. John Richards wrote that although “preconditions for wide-
spread addiction already existed” in the “substantial use of opium”
in Indian society, “[p]aradoxically . . . the Indian subcontinent did
not suffer the ravages . . . that so devastated China and the South-
east Asian countries.”80 Perhaps Richards’ paradox becomes more
transparent if we consider that India and China represented dif-
ferent things to the British Empire. In order to turn a profit on
occupation, the British needed Indians to be good producers. But in
order to profit from trade, the traders needed the Chinese to be
good consumers. For example, we have the emblematic figure G.J.
Gordon, who was responsible for bringing the first group of Chinese
teamakers to Assam in 1836 and who also made a living dealing
opium to Canton through a private firm. His combined success
depended upon both Chinese addiction and Indian sobriety.
But because Bruce saw few alternatives in Assam, the opium
problem “point[ed] out the utility of introducing a superior race of
labourers, who would not only work themselves, but encourage
their women and children to do the same.”81 According to Bruce,
the Assamese refused to allow their women to work on the tea
plantations, but costs could be minimized if whole families of
workers could be transplanted. By the 1860s, Company documents
recorded that families, not just individual males, had begun to
migrate and live on the plantations. The integration of women into
the workforce was gradual; in 1861, only ten percent of plantation
workers were women. But numbers continued to climb since plan-
tation managers understood that the settlement of whole families
guaranteed a much more stable workforce.82 Today, nearly half
overall and over eighty percent of tea pluckers on Indian planta-
tions are women.83
The creation of a self-reproducing Indian workforce emerged as a
recurring Company theme. Like the Chinese tea plant endowing its
best traits onto the Assamese variety, Bruce envisioned replacing
the original Chinese teamakers with natives. He optimistically
speculated that if his original twelve teamakers could teach their
art to twelve “native assistants,” then the latter “may be available
next year to manufacture Tea independently.”84 Looking for South
Asian workers, the Company again relied upon recruitment drives.
Eight agents were sent out at the end of 1839, resulting in batches
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of 400, 156, and 500 coolies over the following year.85 Bruce
remained confident that he could find enough work for the men as
part of his visionary tea plantation of the future.86
Bruce was also aware of the dangers of exhausting the workers’
productivity. He often spoke of improving their quality of life
through employment, echoing the tropes of liberal utilitarianism.
The prohibition of opium, for example, would “benefit [the] people,
and save those who are coming here.”87 Unsurprisingly, however,
the treatment of plantation workers became notoriously cruel over
time. Kaushik Ghosh has documented how plantation officials
deemed the Assamese groups as opium junkies, forcibly importing
workers from the Chotanagpur region of Orissa instead. Known as
Dhangars, they had been targeted for export abroad to replace New
World slavery, carrying the reputation of a wild, aboriginal nature
that could be channeled into productive work. In the late 1850s,
Chotanagpuris were recruited for work in Assam, tied to planta-
tions through indenture contracts “of three to five years . . .
enforced with the threat of imprisonment and heavy fining of any
deserter,” administered by agency houses whose sole purpose was
recruiting bound labor.88 The poor treatment of workers was docu-
mented extensively in government records of the late nineteenth
century, in which British officials were sent to investigate the
gardens’ conditions. Such activities also confirm the larger pattern
of British officials, reliant upon local intermediaries, trafficking
things and people for the sake of establishing a profitable model for
the Indian tea enterprise.
III.
The Real Value of Tea
From the beginning, the plantations of Assam relied upon a tran-
sregional flow of capital, raw materials and labor. An enterprise
with little connection to the local people, the Assam Company’s
mission was to import a hitherto luxury commodity from abroad
and reproduce it on a mass scale using land hitherto perceived as
a wasted resource (best captured in the series of policies sharing
the title “The Wastelands Act”). In the end, Bruce and his men
decided that a combination of Assamese soil, Chinese plants and
imported labor from Orissa and Bihar was the optimal mix for the
enterprise. Each of these items was treated ahistorically, objecti-
fied, analyzed and compared in their immediate properties.
To end this essay, I will briefly argue that the classical debates
from political economy over the relationship between land and
value are instructive for thinking more rigorously about the his-
torical processes through which these various things were ripped
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out of their prior contexts, transported long distances and ulti-
mately found their way onto a British garden in northeast India.
The dynamic circuitry which made Assamese tea production pos-
sible also reveals the limits of the timeless, scientific approach to
political economy permeating the rhetoric of Bruce and of his
contemporaries.
Most famously, Karl Marx criticized the Ricardian idea that value,
qua rent, was something isolatable in the soil and which could be
treated as a thing.89 For Marx, Ricardo’s theory was not complex
enough to understand that the value of land was a socially contin-
gent formation. Where Ricardo believed rent resulted from differ-
ences in land quality, given constant and equal amounts of capital
and labor, Marx argued that constant amounts of capital, labor and
land were a fiction. Due to the historical complexity of differential
capital investment and alterations to the land, it would be impos-
sible to say whether value was a result of the labor, the capital or
the soil.90 Rather than a thing, value belonged “to a definite his-
torical formation of society, which is manifested in a thing and
lends this thing a specific social character.”91 Land was a precon-
dition for creating commodities of value, but the true source was
labor. He wrote:
Value is labour. Therefore surplus-value cannot be earth. Absolute fertility of the soil
effects nothing more than the following: a certain quantity of labour produces a
certain product – in accordance with the natural fertility of the soil. The difference
in soil fertility causes the same quantities of labour and capital, hence the same
value, to be manifested in different quantities of agricultural products; that is,
causes these products to have different individual values.92
Marx’s critique relocated the focus of political economy from
objectified things onto the process of production. By emphasizing
the conditions in which labor and its representation as labor-power
became the measure of value, Marx highlighted the importance of
paying attention to the geographically broad and dynamic socio-
economic conditions that made industrial commodity production
such a profitable and dominant form in the nineteenth century.
Thus, while Bruce fixated on leaves, soil and labor as static things,
their profitability was in actuality made possible by the violent
imposition of the Company over the land, overseas migration and
business networks, and the laborers’ disciplined hours of working
the plantations. In a circular fashion, the utilitarian belief in soil as
the source of value spurred a mass of activity by Bruce and his
botanist-capitalist partners which itself endowed tea with value.
The powers of soil, in other words, were “as much the product of
history as they [were] of nature.”93 Further, as the history of the tea
industry’s creation became forgotten and overshadowed by Bruce’s
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fixation on the land and its plants, so too did the spatial logic of
capital. Without that spatial reach into southern China and other
areas, however, tea could never have become the object of so much
British investment in the jungly wastelands of northeast India.
Correlatively, the proponents of land rent were also open to
criticism for treating agriculture as somehow different from capi-
talist industrial production. Marx dismissed the idea that farming
was more natural than the factories he saw in London since ulti-
mately both followed the principle of capital begetting capital, with
labor at the system’s heart. The farmer, he wrote, “produces
wheat . . . in much the same way as the manufacturer produces
yarn or machines.”94 The industrial dimension of the plantation
explains one of the most striking features of the Assam experi-
ments: their scale. Although not totally unlike the specialized crop
rotations in late imperial China, Assam’s tea industry was marked
by historically rapid speed and breathtaking size. The landscape
was transformed in less than a decade, as employees were ordered
to bring in as many plants and workers as possible. They had the
private capital to subsidize expenses and did not turn a profit for
years. In fact, they did not break even until 1849.95 But once they
had, the investments in dead plants, failed seeds and useless
workers – all the initial expenditures paid off.
The connections to the factories of England not only help explain
the scale and reach of the tea industry, they also demonstrate a
central argument of this essay: that the tea plantation was made
possible by, and made further possible, the vast and uneven spatial
integration of different regions into overlapping economic circuits.
While Bruce focused solely upon harmonizing the land and the seed
as the secret to his business venture, the tea plantation really
emerged from the mutual relationship between highly active trade
circuits encompassing northeastern India, China and Southeast
Asia and the plantation space itself.
It would thus be salutary for scholars of plantations to continu-
ally reflect upon the way plantations were, and continue to be,
made possible by movements far more dynamic than a static,
designated locale such as Assam or Canton. Plantations, although
labeled rural, borrowed much from the factories and workshops of
urban production, and while they were animated by the specificity
of local populations, climates and land, they also constantly, and
mutually, borrowed techniques of management, recruitment and
organization from their siblings around the globe. In the case of
Indian tea, the relationship between value and history is best
illuminated when we consider the plantation as one effect of a
broader trajectory, irreducible to single actors or populations but
rather concurrent with violent social processes. The Assam plan-
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tations resulted from expansive land appropriation in India, the
discipline and recruitment of peasants from Orissa and Bihar,
battles over the right to monopoly in Canton, specialized tea har-
vesting in the tea countries of Fujian, the establishment of Sin-
gapore as the labor hub of Southeast Asia, and the extension and
application of a British political economy tradition emphasizing
utility, improvement and science.
Ultimately, the Assam tea plantations became a deeply ingrained
institution in its immediate vicinity, as Assam and tea are virtually
synonymous today. But the Assamese tea plantation’s origins and
its relationship with the global export crop economy would become
impossible to explain the moment one fails to consider the spatio-
temporal dynamics of colonialism and commodity capital in
nineteenth-century Asia.
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